'India's Grand Strategy in the 1971 War'

<strong>SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ORGANISATION AND DISARMAMENT</strong> a seminar on <strong>'India's Grand Strategy in the 1971 War'</strong> By the end of the 1960s, Indian policymakers knew that there was a very real possibility of a secessionist struggle in East Pakistan. Contrary to popular belief, New Delhi did not want the break-up of Pakistan. It pinned its hopes on a transition to democracy in a united Pakistan and the formation of an Awami League-led government in Islamabad. New Delhi believed that this offered the only possibility of a breakthrough in Indo-Pakistan relations. At the same time, Indian policymakers recognised that, in the event of an outbreak of a secessionist insurgency, India's national interests demanded that she assist the liberation struggle to win an early victory. A prolonged armed struggle, it was feared, would pass under the control of pro-China communists linked to Naxalites in West Bengal. The brutal military crackdown launched on March 25 extinguished all hopes of a transition to democracy in a united Pakistan. Despite public demands, Indira Gandhi ruled out an immediate military intervention, not merely because the army was unprepared but, more importantly, because her principal advisers warned that it would be politically counter-productive. P.N. Haksar pointed out that the principles of territorial integrity of states and non-interference in internal affairs were strongly established in current international law and practice. An Indian military intervention would be condemned by the international community and all the sympathy and support for Bangladesh would be 'drowned in Indo-Pakistan conflict'. An immediate military intervention, without preparing the political ground, would fail to serve the overall political aim of securing international recognition for an independent Bangladesh. In April, Indian policymakers drew up the outline of a grand strategy integrating military, diplomatic and domestic policies. It encompassed training, equipping and assisting the Mukti Bahini; plans for Indian military intervention before the end of the year; mobilising international sympathy and support for Bangladesh, providing shelter to the refugees while preserving harmony between them and severely stressed host communities; as early as in April, India realised the importance of securing Soviet support in the impending struggle. The grand strategy involved the coordinated employment of the full range of policy instruments available to the state - military, diplomatic, political and economic. SPEAKER:&nbsp;<strong>AMBASSADOR CHANDRASHEKHAR DASGUPTA</strong> Chandrashekhar Dasgupta (b. 1940) was an Indian Foreign Service officer from 1962 to his retirement in 2000. Among other posts, he served as Ambassador to the European Union (1996 – 2000) and as Ambassador to China (1993 – 1996). Dasgupta is presently a Member of PM's Council on Climate Change, and Member of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Geneva. He is the author of War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48, and numerous essays and articles on international affairs and global environmental issues. Dasgupta has been awarded the Padma Bhushan by the President of India. <strong>Wednesday, 16 November 2016</strong> &nbsp;